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ABSTRACT
Reynolds, Zachary P. M.S., Purdue University, August 2017. Identifying and Docu-
menting False Positive Patterns Generated by Static Code Analysis Tools. Major
Professor: James H. Hill.
Static code analysis tools are known to flag a large number of false positives. A
false positive is a warning message generated by a static code analysis tool for a loca-
tion in the source code that does not have any known problems. This thesis presents
our approach and results in identifying and documenting false positives generated
by static code analysis tools. The goal of our study was to understand the different
kinds of false positives generated so we can (1) automatically determine if a warning
message from a static code analysis tool truly indicates an error, and (2) reduce the
number of false positives developers must triage. We used two open-source tools and
one commercial tool in our study. Our approach led to a hierarchy of 14 core false pos-
itive patterns, with some patterns appearing in multiple variations. We implemented
checkers to identify the code structures of false positive patterns and to eliminate
them from the output of the tools. Preliminary results showed that we were able to
reduce the number of warnings by 14.0%-99.9% with a precision of 94.2%-100.0% by
applying our false positive filters in different cases.
11 INTRODUCTION
Programmers have relied on two general schools of analysis to enhance software qual-
ity: dynamic and static. Dynamic program analysis executes programs and evaluates
their runtime behavior for testing or profiling [1]. Dynamic analysis exactly deter-
mines the presence of flaws since program information is known at runtime, but it
suffers from the overhead of program execution. Relying on dynamic analysis alone
will expose flaws only late in the development life cycle when they are harder and
more costly to fix [2]. On the other hand, static code analysis checks programs for
errors without actually executing them [3]. Because static analysis does not require
a complete, running software program, defects can be found earlier in the software
life cycle than with dynamic analysis. Static analysis models programs by consider-
ing different control paths and values of variables. Because complex programs have
many inputs and execution environments, efficient static analysis cannot account for
all possible executions. Instead, an abstraction of the program is used that simplifies
analysis while preserving soundness. Static analysis is a sound, conservative approach,
meaning that the results hold for all possible executions but may be weaker than the
truth. Unlike dynamic analysis, static analysis deals with uncertainty, and therefore
results may be imprecise. This thesis focuses on static code analysis in an effort to
improve the quality of static code analysis tools.
Developers and testers can use static code analysis to locate flaws in source code
that (1) are hard to identify manually and (2) can eventually lead to security vul-
nerabilities. For example, some flaws detected by static code analysis include buffer
overflows, null pointer dereferences, misuse of resource handles, and use of variables
before initialization. The MITRE Corporation [4] manages the Common Weakness
Enumeration (CWE) project [5], which catalogs weaknesses that can lead to vulnera-
bilities in software systems. Some weaknesses are abstract (e.g., CWE-118 Improper
2Access of Indexable Resource), while others are concrete (e.g., CWE-121 Stack-based
Buffer Overflow). The CWE project allows static code analysis tool vendors and users
to communicate about the coverage of various analysis tools by using a common lan-
guage.
There are many static code analysis tools available in the market, both open-source
(freely available) and commercial tools [6]. The target programming languages and
software weaknesses vary between tools. For example, CAT.NET [7] specializes in
detecting security flaws in .NET programs, while FindBugs [8] covers a wider range
of CWEs in Java [9]. Some static code analysis tools operate continuously behind-the-
scenes within an integrated development environment without user intervention [10],
while others may be run as stand-alone tools at the request of users [11].
Irrespective of their focus, a characteristic shared by many static code analysis
tools is that they generate large numbers of false positives [12–17] (i.e., the tool
generates a warning message that is incorrect). For example, one study evaluated
how different static code analysis tools performed on the Juliet test suite [18] from
the National Institute of Standards and Technology and discovered a large number of
false positives [19]. For two commercial off-the-shelf static code analysis tools used in
the study, as many as 59% and 63%, respectively, of the warnings generated were false
positives. Other evidence shows that a false positive rate between 30% and 100% is
not uncommon even for tools that effectively find errors [16]. In general, we believe
the number of false positives generated by these tools is large because (1) static code
analysis is hard and (2) it is often better for the tool to state that there is a problem
and be wrong (i.e., a false positive), than to not state that there is a problem and be
wrong (i.e., a false negative).
In either case, there is opportunity to reduce the number of false positives gener-
ated by static code analysis tools. This is important because triaging large numbers
of false positives is time-consuming for developers and may reduce confidence levels
in static code analysis tools. For instance, one study with software developers found
false positives to be one of the most significant barriers to using static code analysis
3tools [11]. Researchers found that a large list of warnings with false positives discour-
aged developers from using the tools in the first place. Instead, developers need to
focus on generated warnings that are true warnings and address them properly. In
order to reduce the number of false positives, however, we must first understand the
different kinds of false positives generated by static code analysis tools. This approach
is similar to the way in which CWEs characterize different kinds of vulnerabilities in
source code. CWEs organize repeated instances of software weaknesses, and we aim
to use the same approach to organize false positive warnings into patterns.
We hypothesize the following:
1. Static code analysis tool false positives occur as recurring patterns.
2. These patterns can be harnessed to reduce the number of false positives in static
code analysis tools.
Our approach is as follows: We ran a set of static code analysis tools over a
code base to identify false positives. Next, we reduced the test cases containing false
positives to a minimized form, giving the core structure causing the false positive.
Then we cataloged the false positives to learn patterns. Finally, we validated our
work with static code analysis tool developers by having them provide feedback on
our false positive patterns.
With this understanding, the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We show that static code analysis tools flag few recurring false positive patterns
when applied to a standardized test suite, such as the Juliet test suite.
• We standardize how to define false positive patterns using a set of descriptive
attributes. These attributes include the following statistics: the false warning
message flagged by the tool; a measure of how often the pattern occurs in tested
source code; a minimized source code snippet showing the essence of the false
positive; and an informal description of the pattern.
4• We create a hierarchical catalog of false positive patterns to better understand
its structure and the variation between similar and different false positive pat-
terns.
• We show the practicality of using a standardized test suite to identify false
positive patterns.
• We design a filter for identifying false positive patterns and for eliminating them
from a static code analysis tool’s output.
We performed our study in the context of both open-source and commercial static
code analysis tools available from both academia and industry. The results of our
study produced a catalog of 14 different false positive patterns, some of which we
validated with static code analysis tool developers.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses existing approaches from
the literature for eliminating false positives in static code analysis tools; Chapter 3
describes our approach for identifying and documenting false positive patterns; Chap-
ter 4 presents our catalog of false positive patterns and other results from documenting
false positive patterns; Chapter 5 presents our preliminary work on filtering out false
positives from a tool’s output based on the information in our catalog; and Chapter 6
concludes the thesis. Finally, Appendix A provides an abbreviated version of our false
positive catalog, and Appendix B describes our implementation details for filtering
out instances of one false positive pattern.
52 RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses other approaches in the literature for reducing the number of
false positive reports from static code analysis tools.
2.1 Machine Learning
A number of studies have applied machine learning techniques on characteristics
describing the warning and its context obtained via static code analysis tools. Yuksel
and Sozer [20] developed a binary classifier to distinguish between true and false warn-
ings based on 10 attributes, including the warning severity, type of warning, number
of warnings in the file, and length of time the warning has persisted through consecu-
tive runs of the static code analysis tool. While the authors concluded their approach
to be viable, their classifier still depended on the developer’s initial perception of the
error—whether it was an actual error or could be ignored. Similarly, Heckman and
Williams [21] applied machine learning techniques to predict false warnings based on
a number of software and revision control metrics. Both the ideal machine learning
technique and the set of important metrics for classification needed to be tuned to
the specific software program being analyzed. Unlike these prevalent approaches, this
thesis uses the structure of the source code to identify false positives.
Tripp et al. [17] also addressed the problem of false positives with a variety of
machine learning techniques. Their model, which was named Eletheia, required
the user to manually classify a subset of the warnings. Eletheia then automatically
constructed a statistical filter and ran the filter over the remaining warnings, removing
warnings classified as false positives. Unlike other automated approaches, Eletheia
allowed the user to customize the filter to prioritize either removal of false positives
or preservation of true positives. The learning features used by Eletheia included
6a limited number of structural aspects, such as function names of data sources and
sinks, but this thesis focuses solely on structure to classify false positives. In addition,
the creation of a false positive catalog in this thesis enables identification of high-level
constructs that tend to generate false positives.
Koc et al. [22] trained both a Bayesian classifier and a long short-term memories
(LSTM) neural network to remove false positives in Java code. The authors trained
their models on bytecode instructions, which are simplified and easier to analyze with
machine learning techniques as compared to source code. They showed that it was
possible to infer structures tending to generate false positives, but these were necessar-
ily micro-level structures since they were based on individual bytecode instructions.
This thesis seeks to identify macro-level structures based on the source code.
2.2 Formal Methods
Other methods of eliminating false positives examine the software program itself
for each individual warning using formal methods. Arzt et al. [23] created a symbolic
execution program to remove dataflow false positives from a static code analysis tool
output for Android applications. Their filtering mechanism, known as TASMAN,
scanned conditionals along a reported warning path for logical contradictions. Warn-
ings with paths that were provably impossible were eliminated as false positives. The
authors observed that many conditionals were not local and could therefore not be
thoroughly analyzed by a trivial analysis, producing these false positives. This false
positive elimination approach gave perfect precision (no actual errors were eliminated)
on both artificial benchmarks and real-world applications and eliminated 80% of the
false positives for one benchmark. Unlike the approach in this thesis, TASMAN is
fully automated, but it suffers from considerable processing time, requiring over 5
seconds on average to evaluate each warning. Their approach also has limited ap-
plicability because it can be applied only when values of variables can be statically
7determined from the source code. This thesis addresses this challenge by allowing
any false positive to be eliminated if its structure has been identified.
Muske et al. [24] augmented static analysis with model checking to improve preci-
sion. In their work, a model checker generated assertions associated with each static
code analysis tool warning. Warnings associated with assertions that could be verified
were eliminated as false positives. As in [23], the verification process was slow, but
the authors introduced a set of optimizations to avoid verifying assertions that would
not eliminate additional false positives. These optimizations reduced processing time
by 60%. Unlike formal methods, this thesis relies on the hypothesis that patterns of
false positives exist that can be harnessed to quickly eliminate similar false positives
in other contexts.
2.3 Pattern Identification
Finally, some work has been done to classify warnings according to patterns.
Ayewah et al. [15] manually classified warnings from FindBugs [8] on several open-
source projects into three classes: false positives, trivial bugs, and serious bugs. Triv-
ial bugs indicated actual defects but had little to no impact on the application’s
functionality. The authors reported 6 categories of trivial bugs and found that many
of these bugs were intentional and/or the result of poor programming practices. These
6 categories were high-level and did not describe the code structure, unlike this the-
sis. For example, one category of trivial bugs from the authors’ study was testing
code, where FindBugs flagged an unusual situation in a test case, but the test case
was specifically designed to test for the unusual situation.1 The authors therefore
classified this category as a trivial bug. This thesis builds on their work by cataloging
false warnings according to code structure with the intent of automatically identifying
false positive patterns in other contexts.
1An example given in the paper was to check that .equals(null) returns false to ensure that the
equals() method could handle a null argument.
8Beller et al. [25] recently proposed a classification scheme for both software defects
and warnings from static code analysis tools. Their General Defect Classification
(GDC) scheme was designed to map warnings from different static code analysis tools
to the same classification hierarchy. However, the scheme’s classification categories
are too broad and at a high-level to classify false positives with respect to structure.
For example, while the scheme may distinguish between resource and logic warnings—
two categories of the GDC scheme—these categories do not account for the different
code structures that may generate resource or logic warnings. This thesis seeks a
more detailed classification hierarchy that can capture the structure of the source
code. This thesis also focuses on cataloging patterns of false warnings, instead of
cataloging all warnings from static code analysis tools.
93 APPROACH
This chapter describes our approach to identifying false positive patterns. Figure 3.1
provides an overview of our approach. As shown in this figure, our approach involved
the following steps:
1. We selected the set of static code analysis tools to use;
2. We selected the codebase over which to run the static code analysis tools;
3. We ran the static code analysis tools over the codebase to identify false positives;
4. We reduced the source code files generating false positives to a minimized form;
5. We cataloged the false positives to learn false positive patterns; and
6. We provided feedback to the static code analysis tool developers to validate our
work.
Each step in our process is discussed in more detail in the following sections.
3.1 Selecting the Static Code Analysis Toolset
The first step was to select the set of static code analysis tools to use in our
experiment. We selected three static code analysis tools, as listed in Table 3.1. We
have removed the tool names in accordance with our agreement with the tool vendors.
We included two open-source tools because they are freely available and provide a base
case to compare against other tools. We also included a state-of-the-art commercial
tool because commercial tools are considered to be more reliable than open-source
tools [26].
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1. Select toolset 2. Select codebase 
4. Reduce false 
positive code snippets 
5. Catalog false 
positive patterns 
3. Identify 
false positives 
6. Give feedback 
Figure 3.1.: General approach for identifying false positives generated by static code
analysis tools.
Table 3.1.: Static code analysis tools selected for our experiment.
Static code analysis tool Tool type
Tool A Open source
Tool B Open source
Tool C Commercial
3.2 Selecting the Codebase for Analysis
The next step in our process was to select the codebase for our study. We selected
the C/C++ Juliet test suite version 1.2 [18] from the National Security Agency (NSA)
Center for Assured Software. We selected the Juliet test suite because it was designed
specifically for evaluating how static code analysis tools perform against known weak-
nesses in source code that can lead to security vulnerabilities. While the Juliet test
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suite also contains a Java version, we limited our scope to the C/C++ version. The
C/C++ languages are generally considered less secure and more vulnerable to certain
flaws, such as memory corruption, that are prevented in Java by its type system [27].
We therefore believed C/C++ would provide greater insight into our experiment.
The Juliet test suite contains 61,387 individual test cases grouped according to 118
different weaknesses as identified by the MITRE’s Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) [28]. Each CWE is numbered arbitrarily and assigned a name that reflects the
concern being documented. For example, CWE-457 is named “Use of Uninitialized
Variable,” which implies the weakness documents code that uses a variable that has
not been initialized. Likewise, CWE-415 is named “Double Free,” which implies the
weakness documents code that deallocates the same memory location twice. Each
test case expresses a flaw of a particular CWE, which is said to be the weakness that
the test case targets.
Juliet test cases are further organized by flow variants, which are different control
and data flows for expressing the same flaw. Similar to CWEs, flow variants are
numbered. For example, the first flow variant—referred to as baseline—captures the
simplest form of the flaw without any additional complexity. Likewise, flow variant 9
controls the program flow with a conditional that evaluates a constant global variable,
while flow variant 72 passes data from one function to another via a vector.
One advantage of using Juliet for our study is that each test case is annotated
with the following information:
• Flaw. A FLAW annotation denotes the location of the error of the target weak-
ness.
• Potential flaw. For target weakness that involve both sources (i.e., where the
flaw originates) and sinks (i.e., where the error actually arises), POTENTIAL FLAW
annotations are used in both locations. For example, for a weakness involving
tainted data, the source may read untrusted data from the user, while the sink
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may perform a security-critical operation with that data, such as a database
write [17].
• Fix. When possible, the Juliet test suite includes a non-flawed version of a test
case that performs the same functionality as the flawed version, but does not
contain the target weakness. In this case, a FIX annotation denotes a change
to the source code to remove the flaw.
• Incidental. An INCIDENTAL annotation marks an unavoidable flaw whose type
is different from the target weakness.
The annotations in Juliet allow us to quickly identify true positives, false positives,
and false negatives generated by a static code analysis tool. For example, Listing 3.1
shows a snippet of a Juliet test case with a target error of CWE-369 Divide By Zero,
slightly simplified for readability. This code snippet contains a divide-by-zero flaw
that can occur for some user input.1 The first POTENTIAL FLAW annotation on line 9
marks the source of the flaw, while the second annotation on line 19 marks the sink
of the flaw.
Listing 3.2 on page 14 is a non-flawed version of the test case given in Listing 3.1.
An appropriate fix to this program could be a change to either the source or sink
of the flaw. Listing 3.2 changes the source by initializing the data variable to a
known non-zero value and thus avoids the divide-by-zero error. The FIX annotation
on line 12 denotes this change. The sink was not changed, so the POTENTIAL FLAW
annotation remains on line 16. Note then that a FIX annotation in the same test case
as a POTENTIAL FLAW annotation indicates a non-flawed version. The INCIDENTAL
annotation on line 8 of Listing 3.2 marks a legitimate dead code error not of the
target error type. Because the 0 in the condition on line 7 will evaluate to false, the
printLine() statement will never execute. Therefore, the statement is dead code.
1Any user input that evaluates to 0 will cause a divide-by-zero error.
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1 // CWE369_Divide_by_Zero__int_fgets_divide_02 . c
2 . . .
3 void CWE369_Divide_by_Zero__int_fgets_divide_02_bad ( ) {
4 int data ;
5 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e data ∗/
6 data = −1;
7 i f (1 ) {
8 char i nputBuf f e r [CHAR_ARRAY_SIZE] = " " ;
9 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Read data from the conso le us ing f g e t s ( ) ∗/
10 i f ( f g e t s ( inputBuf fer , CHAR_ARRAY_SIZE, s td in ) != NULL) {
11 /∗ Convert to i n t ∗/
12 data = a to i ( inputBuf f e r ) ;
13 }
14 else {
15 pr in tL ine ( " f g e t s ( ) f a i l e d . " ) ;
16 }
17 }
18 i f (1 ) {
19 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Pos s i b l y d i v i d e by zero ∗/
20 p r i n t In tL in e (100 / data ) ;
21 }
22 }
23 . . .
Listing 3.1: Snippet of a Juliet test case showing flaw annotations.
Another advantage of the Juliet test suite is that the flaws are simplified versions of
problems that occur in more complex source code. This makes it easier to understand
the source code and corresponding software weaknesses.
3.3 Identifying the Generated False Positives
As the next step, we ran the static code analysis tools over the Juliet test suite to
identify false positives. We define a false positive as a warning message generated by
a static code analysis tool for a location in the source code that does not have any
known problems. Other studies have defined false positives more broadly. Heckman
and Williams [21] considered warnings that indicate actual defects but which pose no
14
1 // CWE369_Divide_by_Zero__int_fgets_divide_02 . c
2 . . .
3 stat ic void goodG2B1 ( ) {
4 int data ;
5 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e data ∗/
6 data = −1;
7 i f (0 ) {
8 /∗ INCIDENTAL: CWE 561 Dead Code ∗/
9 pr in tL ine ( " Benign , f i x e d s t r i n g " ) ;
10 }
11 else {
12 /∗ FIX : Use a va lue not equa l to zero ∗/
13 data = 7 ;
14 }
15 i f (1 ) {
16 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Pos s i b l y d i v i d e by zero ∗/
17 p r i n t In tL in e (100 / data ) ;
18 }
19 }
20 . . .
Listing 3.2: Snippet of a Juliet test case showing a fix annotation.
significant threat to a program’s functionality as false positives. For example, a warn-
ing could indicate a potential maintainability issue that does not affect functionality,
and addressing the warning could arguably introduce other more serious defects. In
this case, the warning would be deemed unactionable since the developer should not
take action to fix it. To provide a more objective analysis, however, we focused on
warnings that did not indicate actual defects.
To better understand the problem, Listing 3.3 shows a simplified code snippet
from the Juliet test suite that causes Tool A to generate a false positive. The code
snippet initializes a char array to the empty string. Data is then read from stdin
using fgets() and stored in the array variable. A maximum of 9 characters will be
read in addition to the null character. Because the program writes to the beginning
of the array and the array has space for 10 characters, all memory accesses will be
valid. It is also possible that fewer than 10 characters will be written based on the
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input, but no more than 10. Therefore, no write will occur outside the bounds of the
buffer. Unfortunately, Tool A warns that the buffer is accessed out of bounds during
the write operation.2 (We have added the “Warning” annotation in the source code
to indicate this warning message, as we have done with other code listings throughout
this thesis.) We regard this warning as a false positive.
1 // CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_fgets_01 . c
2 // Pattern : bu f f e r−underf low−usage
3 #include <s td i o . h>
4 #define BUFFER_SIZE 10
5
6 int main (void ) {
7 char bu f f e r [BUFFER_SIZE] = " " ;
8 // Warning : Buf fer i s accessed out o f bounds .
9 f g e t s ( bu f f e r , BUFFER_SIZE, s td in ) ;
10 return 0 ;
11 }
Listing 3.3: False positive example from a simplified Juliet test case.
This example is a trivial program. For more complicated programs, we must
consider multiple input scenarios to determine whether a warning can occur or not.
For example, consider a buffer overflow warning flagged by a static code analysis tool.
Suppose only an unusual input to the program will actually cause a buffer overflow at
the warned location, while all other inputs cause the program to execute safely. Buffer
overflows are serious flaws that can compromise data integrity and confidentiality [29].
Therefore, even though the warning may not be realized for some inputs, we regard
such a warning to be a true positive.
There are also cases where a static code analysis tool flags an error that cannot
occur for the given calling context but may occur for a different context. For example,
consider Listing 3.4, which is another code snippet from the Juliet test suite. Tool
C warns that a buffer overrun occurs while reading an element of the list on line 7.
2Note that adding a check for the return value of fgets() still causes the static code analysis tool
to display a warning message.
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However, this program will not cause a buffer overrun because an item is pushed onto
the list before being accessed in the good() function, and only the main() function
invokes good(). If the good() function, however, is executed in a different context
(e.g., the push_back() call is omitted on line 13), the warning may occur. Therefore,
the buffer overrun will not occur with the program implemented “as-is,” but the
warning may be legitimate in another context. This false positive is introduced due
to context insensitivity [17], an approximation made by some static code analysis tools
to achieve scalability at the expense of loss of precision. We still regard an example
like this to be a false positive for the given context.
1 // J u l i e t CWE476_NULL_Pointer_Dereference__char_73b . cpp
2 // Pattern : l i s t −overrun
3 #include <l i s t >
4
5 void good ( std : : l i s t <char ∗> dataL i s t ) {
6 // Warning : Buf fer overrun .
7 char ∗ data = dataL i s t . back ( ) ;
8 }
9
10 int main (void ) {
11 char ∗ s t r = " t e s t s t r i n g " ;
12 std : : l i s t <char ∗> dataL i s t ;
13 dataL i s t . push_back ( s t r ) ;
14 good ( dataL i s t ) ;
15 return 0 ;
16 }
Listing 3.4: False positive example from the Juliet test suite under a particular
execution context.
Unfortunately, there is no easy (or automated) method for identifying in general
whether a generated warning message is indeed a false positive or not. Fortunately,
we are using the Juliet test suite, which makes it possible to automatically identify
a false positive. For example, a warning message is a false positive in the context of
the Juliet test suite when there are no annotated flaws on the same line flagged by
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the warning message. In addition, other warnings are false positives if they are of the
same type targeted by the test case but are flagged in a fixed version of the test case.
We therefore leveraged prior research from our group on evaluating static code
analysis tools to quickly locate false positives generated by each static code analysis
tool used in our study. More specifically, we integrated each static code analysis
tool into the Static Code Analysis Tool Evaluator (SCATE) [19], a framework for
evaluating the quality of static code analysis tools. SCATE uses rules similar to the
foregoing to automatically classify static code analysis tool warnings in the Juliet
test suite. Next, we executed the static code analysis tools against the Juliet test
suite and filtered out warnings classified as false positives by SCATE. After that, we
verified that the warnings were indeed false positives. Note that because of the sheer
number of warnings classified as false by SCATE, we sampled SCATE’s output. For
our verification process, we inspected the source code and executed the test cases
with dynamic profiling tools, such as Valgrind [30], which can indicate the presence
of runtime errors (e.g., memory leaks, out-of-bound reads or writes, etc.).
If our careful inspection and dynamic analysis indicated that the warning was
a false positive, then we concluded the warning to be a false positive for the given
context. We then studied the program’s input to determine the context of the false
positive. A warning may be a false positive for a given execution but a true positive
in other contexts. For example, the warning generated by a static code analysis tool
in Listing 3.4 on the previous page is false for the given context (with an element
pushed to the list) but true if an empty list is passed.
To illustrate this verification process, Listing 3.5 shows a portion of a Juliet test
case with a false positive. Lines 6 and 7 declare a pointer and a reference to a pointer,
respectively. Next, the value Good is assigned to the pointer location. Finally, on
lines 12-14, the value is read through the reference-to-pointer and printed. One static
code analysis tool reports a warning on line 9 of Listing 3.5 that a stored value is
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never read. Executing the program shows that the value “G” is actually read and
printed in its hexadecimal form 47.3 This warning is therefore a false positive.
1 #include " s td_te s t ca s e . h "
2 #include <wchar . h>
3 . . .
4 #ifndef OMITGOOD
5 stat ic void goodG2B ( ) {
6 char ∗ data ;
7 char ∗ &dataRef = data ;
8 /∗ FIX : I n i t i a l i z e data ∗/
9 // Warning : Value s to red to ' data ' i s never read .
10 data = "Good" ;
11 {
12 char ∗ data = dataRef ;
13 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Attempt to use data , which may be NULL ∗/
14 printHexCharLine ( data [ 0 ] ) ;
15 }
16 }
17 . . .
18 void good ( ) {
19 goodG2B ( ) ;
20 goodB2G ( ) ;
21 }
22 #endif /∗ OMITGOOD ∗/
23 . . .
24 int main ( int argc , char ∗ argv [ ] ) {
25 . . .
26 good ( ) ;
27 . . .
28 return 0 ;
29 }
Listing 3.5: Example false positive warning in a Juliet test case.
3Note that printing the value as character data instead of as hexadecimal data does not change the
static code analysis tool warning.
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3.4 Reducing the Source Code
After finding a false positive message, we manually reduced the source code that
generated the false positive. By reduced, we mean we removed all elements of the
source code not related to the false positive until the removal of the next element
resulted in the false positive message disappearing. We reduced the source code
because it allowed us to better identify the cause of the false positive since only the
essence of the problem remained. We refer to the reduced source code, along with
a set of descriptive attributes defined in Section 3.5, as a false positive pattern. For
example, Listing 3.6 shows the reduced code for Listing 3.5. It should also be noted
that this reduction accomplishes more than is first apparent, because the original test
case in Listing 3.5 was 118 lines long, and we reduced it to only 10 lines; we showed
only the most relevant code in Listing 3.5 due to space limitations. Here are key
observations about our reduction:
• The false positive was still present in the reduced code. This is a critical point
and is true for all reduced false positives. In other words, running the static
code analysis tool on the reduced code still gave the same warning, and the
warning was false. There are two other possibilities after reduction: (1) the
analysis tool flagged the same warning message, but now the warning was true,
or (2) the analysis tool no longer flagged the warning. Either case indicated we
reduced the code too far, requiring us to backtrack to the previous state of the
program.
• Unnecessary functions were removed, and relevant functions were renamed to
meaningful names. In the original code of Listing 3.5, the program flow tran-
sitioned from main() to good() to goodG2B(). As the reduced code shows,
main() and good() were not relevant to the false positive, so they were re-
moved. We discovered unnecessary functions by trial and error.
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• Reduction within relevant functions was performed. The code on lines 12-14 in
the goodG2B() function of Listing 3.5 was moved out of the nested brackets,
and the data was read directly from the dataRef reference.
• Dependence on domain-specific code libraries was eliminated. The header std_
testcase.h (see line 1 of Listing 3.5) defines reusable types and functions that
test cases depend on. We removed this dependency and substituted these types
and functions for standard C/C++ ones. For example, the printHexCharLine()
call on line 14 was replaced with a printf() call. The reduced code was more
self-contained and allowed us to focus on the code structures relevant to the
false positive.
1 #include <s td i o . h>
2
3 int main (void ) {
4 char ∗ data ;
5 char ∗ &dataRef = data ;
6 // Warning : Value s to red to ' data ' i s never read .
7 data = "Good" ;
8 p r i n t f ( "%c\n" , dataRef [ 0 ] ) ;
9 return 0 ;
10 }
Listing 3.6: Reduced version of Listing 3.5.
Listing 3.7 on the following page and Listing 3.8 on page 22 show the original
code and reduced code, respectively, of another false positive. Beginning on line 19
of the original code, the goodG2B2() function allocates a char array on the stack and
defines a char pointer data to point to the array. The data pointer is passed to the
goodG2B2Source() function, where the data is initialized and the pointer is returned.
One static code analysis tool generates a warning that the goodG2B2Source() func-
tion returns a pointer to a local variable. The returned data pointer, however, was
itself passed as a parameter to the goodG2B2Source() function. The pointer there-
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1 #include " s td_te s t ca s e . h "
2 #include <wchar . h>
3 #ifndef OMITGOOD
4 /∗ The s t a t i c v a r i a b l e s below are used to dr i v e
5 con t ro l f l ow in the source func t i ons . ∗/
6 stat ic int goodG2B2Static = 0 ;
7 . . .
8 /∗ goodG2B2 () − use goodsource and bads ink by r e v e r s ing
9 the b l o c k s in the i f in the source func t i on ∗/
10 stat ic char ∗ goodG2B2Source (char ∗ data ) {
11 i f ( goodG2B2Static ) {
12 /∗ FIX : Proper ly i n i t i a l i z e data ∗/
13 data [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ; /∗ nu l l terminate ∗/
14 }
15 // Warning : Pointer to l o c a l array v a r i a b l e re turned .
16 return data ;
17 }
18 stat ic void goodG2B2 ( ) {
19 char ∗ data ;
20 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 0 ] ;
21 data = dataBuf fe r ;
22 goodG2B2Static = 1 ; /∗ t rue ∗/
23 data = goodG2B2Source ( data ) ;
24 {
25 char source [ 1 0 0 ] ;
26 memset ( source , 'C ' , 100−1) ; /∗ f i l l wi th 'C ' s ∗/
27 source [100−1] = ' \0 ' ; /∗ nu l l terminate ∗/
28 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: I f data i s not i n i t i a l i z e d
29 proper ly , s t r c a t ( ) may not func t i on c o r r e c t l y ∗/
30 s t r c a t ( data , source ) ;
31 pr in tL ine ( data ) ;
32 }
33 }
34 void CWE665_Improper_Initialization__char_cat_21_good ( ) {
35 goodG2B1 ( ) ;
36 goodG2B2 ( ) ;
37 }
38 #endif /∗ OMITGOOD ∗/
39 . . .
40 int main ( int argc , char ∗ argv [ ] ) {
41 . . .
42 CWE665_Improper_Initialization__char_cat_21_good ( ) ;
43 . . .
44 return 0 ;
45 }
Listing 3.7: Original code of Return Local Param false positive pattern.
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1 // CWE665_Improper_Initialization__char_cat_21 . c
2 // Pattern : return−l o ca l−param
3 char ∗ he lpe r (char ∗ data ) {
4 // Warning : Pointer to l o c a l array v a r i a b l e re turned .
5 return data ;
6 }
7
8 int main (void ) {
9 char ∗ data ;
10 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 ] ;
11 data = dataBuf fe r ;
12 data = he lpe r ( data ) ;
13 return 0 ;
14 }
Listing 3.8: Reduced code of Return Local Param false positive pattern.
fore still has meaning to the caller within goodG2B2(), making this warning message
a false positive message.
The reduction methods used in the first example of this section were also applied to
this example. We removed unneeded functions, reduced within the relevant functions
goodG2B2() and goodG2B2Source(), renamed these functions to meaningful names,
and removed dependence on Juliet test case support files. The initialization performed
inside goodG2B2Source() was also irrelevant to the false positive because the static
code analysis tool still generated the warning if the initialization was removed. The
reduced code is therefore more succinct than the original code. It also clearly shows
the structure that causes the false positive—returning the data pointer parameter
from the helper() function. As in the previous example, moving from the original
code (156 lines) to the reduced code (12 lines without the added header comments)
demonstrates significant reduction and isolates the source of the false positive.
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3.5 Cataloging Patterns
After reducing the source code that produced a false positive message by a static
code analysis tool, we cataloged the reduced code along with a few descriptive at-
tributes. Recall that the reduced code with the attributes define the false positive
pattern. The goal of cataloging the false positive pattern was to identify recurring
source code structures in the codebase that cause static code analysis tools to generate
false positives. This approach is similar to documenting software design patterns [31]
or cataloging software weaknesses [28]. In all these scenarios, the goal is to cap-
ture similarities of many instances so the knowledge can be documented and applied
elsewhere.
Each documented false positive pattern in our catalog has the following attributes:
• Name. The name is a short phrase describing the code structure of the false
positive pattern.
• False positive warning. The false positive warning is the warning message
from the static code analysis tool, or tools. We say tools because some false
positive patterns were identified by multiple tools. If multiple tools flagged
the pattern, we recorded an abstract warning message. For example, if Tool
A gave an “uninitialized variable: username” false warning while Tool B gave
a “function call argument is an uninitialized value” false warning for the same
use of a variable, we abstracted the warning to simply “uninitialized variable.”
• Description. The description is an informal, high-level explanation of the code
structure causing the false positive.
• Tools. This attribute records the list of static code analysis tool(s) which
reported the false positive pattern.
• Frequency. Frequency is a measure of how often the false positive appeared in
the codebase. As one measure, we recorded the number of unique occurrences
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of the pattern as a basic frequency attribute.4 In addition, certain software do-
mains may benefit from other attributes for indicating a pattern’s prevalence.
For example, the Juliet test suite organizes test cases according to two indepen-
dent attributes that can provide more detailed frequency information: CWEs
and flow variants (both described in Section 3.2). We recorded both CWEs
and flow variants in which the false positive was present to determine if a false
positive pattern was limited to a specific context or widespread. This is another
benefit of using a standardized, well-organized test suite such as Juliet.
• Code snippet. We included a reduced C/C++ code snippet of the false posi-
tive using the reduction method discussed in Section 3.4. We commented each
code snippet with the name of the test case in Juliet from which it was derived.
We also included the false warning flagged by the analysis tool immediately
before the line flagged by the tool. If multiple tools flagged the same warning,
we listed each tool, along with the exact text of the warning messages.
• Changes. Changes are minor modifications to the reduced code snippet, along
with the static code analysis tool result. We made these changes intuitively with
the goal of having the tool no longer flag the warning. Some changes caused
the false warning to disappear, others did not, but each change still provided
important insight. By comparing the reduced code with the changes, we can
better understand the code structures causing the false positive. We stored
both the changed source code snippet(s) and the results from the static code
analysis tools, in addition to the unchanged (reduced) code snippet.
For example, we cataloged the Buffer Underflow Usage false positive pattern as
follows:
• False positive warning: Buffer is accessed out of bounds.
4Some patterns occurred often, so we relied on sampling to obtain a frequency approximation. See
Section 4.4 for more information.
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• Description: A value is stored to a buffer after the buffer is initialized. Let L
be the length of the value that is stored. The buffer must have been initialized
to a value of length less than L-1.
• Tools: Tool A.5
• Frequency: 3,685 occurrences. Occurs in the following CWEs: 127, 134, 190,
194, 195, 197, 226, 367, 369, 400, 517, 617. Not specific to any particular flow
variant.
• Code snippet: Listing 3.9 gives the reduced code snippet for this pattern. This
reduced code is the same as in Listing 3.3 on page 15, but we annotated the code
with the names of the static code analysis tools that flagged the false positive. In
this case, only Tool A generated a false positive. We also annotated on the first
two lines (1) the filename in the Juliet test suite from which we extracted the
pattern and (2) the name we designed for the false positive pattern, respectively.
• Changes: Increasing the length of the buffer’s initial value to L-1 causes the
tool to no longer flag the false positive.
We performed the process in this chapter iteratively for each false positive we
inspected, producing a total of 27 false positive patterns. We stored the catalog of
false positive patterns in a GitHub repository.6 If a newly reduced false positive
structure matched an existing pattern in the catalog, then we did not create a new
pattern. Instead, we updated the existing pattern’s frequency attribute. If a reduced
structure was similar to an existing pattern but had no match, then we created a
generalized description of the false positive with the concrete patterns as variants (or
child patterns) of the general pattern. This approach is similar to object-oriented
design: the general pattern captured the similarities of its child patterns, while the
5The name of the tool is removed to achieve anonymity.
6The GitHub repository can be found at the following location: https://github.com/SEDS/
mangrove-catalog/wiki. An abbreviated version of the catalog is provided in Appendix A of
this thesis.
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1 // CWE121_Stack_Based_Buffer_Overflow__CWE129_fgets_01 . c
2 // Pattern : bu f f e r−underf low−usage
3 #include <s td i o . h>
4 #define BUFFER_SIZE 10
5
6 int main (void ) {
7 char bu f f e r [BUFFER_SIZE] = " " ;
8 // Tool A FP: Buf fer i s accessed out o f bounds .
9 // Tool B FP: None
10 // Tool C FP: None
11 f g e t s ( bu f f e r , BUFFER_SIZE, s td in ) ;
12 return 0 ;
13 }
Listing 3.9: Reduced code snippet for the Buffer Underflow Usage false positive
pattern.
child patterns specified concrete details that distinguished them from other child
patterns. As a result, we produced a hierarchy of false positive patterns, as illustrated
in Section 4.1.
3.6 Giving Feedback to Static Code Analysis Tool Developers
The last step in our approach was to validate the identified false positive patterns
by submitting our findings to static code analysis tool developers. We then requested
the developers to review the submitted artifacts and confirm that each false positive
was indeed a false positive. Section 4.3 discusses our results from this validation.
To summarize this chapter, we selected a toolset of two open-source static code
analysis tools and one commercial tool. We selected the Juliet test suite for our
codebase because it is designed for testing static code analysis tools, is annotated
with the locations of software weaknesses, and enables automated classification of
warnings from tools. We used our automated classifier on the output of the tools to
filter out false positives, which we manually verified to be false. Then we manually
reduced the source code snippets producing false positives to minimal forms in order
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to identify core structures leading to false positives. Next, we cataloged the false
positives with their associated code snippets, false warning messages, descriptions,
tool names, frequencies, and other information to produce false positive patterns.
Finally, we validated our work by submitting false positive patterns from our catalog
to the tool developer industry for feedback.
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4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section discusses our results from identifying and documenting false positive
patterns generated by static code analysis tools.
4.1 False Positive Hierarchy
Figure 4.1 shows a hierarchical view of the false positive patterns that we have
identified and documented.1 The patterns are organized as nodes and are pictured
with their names from our catalog. As captured in Figure 4.1, some patterns are
variations of one another—hence the multiple layers. At the first column, there are
14 distinct false positive patterns that have no common code structure; we refer
to these as pattern families. The false positive patterns in the right-hand columns
are variations of these core patterns—producing a total of 27 concrete false positive
patterns (leaf nodes in Figure 4.1).
Nodes are colored according to which static code analysis tools flagged the false
positive patterns. Gray nodes are abstract false positive patterns; that is, they ab-
stract out a common structure from multiple false positive patterns. We cataloged
code snippets only for colored (leaf) patterns. For example, the Operation Through
Alias abstract pattern performs an operation on a resource through an alias, with
the exact operation determined by the concrete pattern: one child concrete pattern
Ref Ptr Read reads a character array through a reference to a pointer, while another
child concrete pattern Subscope Leak deallocates a memory block in a subscope (i.e.,
in a different scope that is still visible to the scope that performed the allocation).
Sometimes concrete patterns of the same abstract pattern resulted in different
static code analysis tool warnings, as with the Operation Through Alias pattern. For
1An abbreviated form of the false positive catalog is included in Appendix A.
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Static code analysis toolset
14. Union
simultaneous access
13. Sscanf uninit var
12. Return local param
11. Predictable conditional
Externally defined
symbols
Conditional mem leak
Conditional null ptr
Conditional uninit var
Conditional mem leak
external function
Conditional mem leak
external var
Conditional null ptr
external function
Conditional uninit var
external function
Conditional uninit var
external var
Intermediate
function call
Ref ptr read
Sub-scope leak
10. Operation through alias
9. Null array access
8. List overrun
7. File close virtual method
6. Clear list
5. Buffer underflow usage
Buffer store fgets
Buffer store socket
Buffer store strncat
4. Buffer store
3. Array resize
2. Array input conditional
Alloc using
function param
Alloc using global var
Alloc using property
1. Alloc using
external size
Tool A Tool B Tool C*
*Commercial tool
Figure 4.1.: Hierarchy of identified false positive patterns when executing static code
analysis tools against the Juliet test suite. The 14 core false positive patterns or
pattern families are numbered in the first column.
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Ref Ptr Read, Tool B warned that a stored value was never read, while for Subscope
Leak, Tool A warned that a memory leak occurred. In this case, we did not include
a warning at the abstract level since it differed among the concrete patterns.
In other cases, as with Buffer Store, the warning was the same for all concrete
patterns of the abstract false positive pattern. The abstract Buffer Store pattern
read data from a source and wrote it safely to a buffer. However, Tool C warned
that the buffer write was tainted and could result in a buffer overflow. Each of the
three child concrete patterns of the Buffer Store pattern used a different source for
the data: either a file, a socket, or an environment variable. For each of these sources,
the input data was properly trimmed according to the length of the buffer, so the
warning was a false positive.
Some false positive patterns were prevalent across multiple tools, while others
were specific to a single tool. Most of the concrete child patterns of the Predictable
Conditional abstract pattern, for example, occurred in both Tools A and B. On the
other hand, most of the other patterns were flagged only by a single tool, such as
Array Input Conditional, Buffer Underflow Usage, and Null Array Access, to name a
few.
In addition to the structural relationships depicted in Figure 4.1, we noticed an
orthogonal manner in which patterns aligned to layers. We observed two levels of
pattern abstractions in our catalog: lower-level implementation concerns and higher-
level design concerns. Many of the child patterns of the Predictable Conditional
pattern, for example, are at the design level because they involved global variables
that analysis tools could not correctly reason about. This situation advised a design
refactor, such as replacing the use of global variables with the Singleton design pat-
tern [32]. In addition, the Array Input Conditional pattern included an important
edge case that confused the analysis tool, which incorrectly indicated the edge case
was unnecessary. Because of the suggested design change, we regard this pattern to
be at the design level as well. On the other hand, the patterns List Overrun and
Sscanf Uninit Var are examples of implementation-level patterns. These two false
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positives could be addressed by static code analysis tool users by performing a simple
boundary check or return value check, respectively. The amount of effort needed to
address these situations and other implementation-level concerns is minimal. Indeed,
from the tool developer’s perspective, the aforementioned user action may resolve the
false positive issue completely. Thus, compared to design-level patterns, we regard
implementation-level patterns as having low severity. Understanding the significance
of these abstractions and their correlation with severity will continue to be explored
in a future research direction.
4.2 False Positive Pattern Examples
In this section, we describe and give code examples of a few false positive patterns
from our catalog.
4.2.1 Conditional Mem Leak False Positive Pattern
As we tested different static code analysis tools, it became clear that global vari-
ables were a significant source of false positive warnings, particularly with the two
open source tools. The commercial tool was able to more accurately analyze con-
trol flow that involved global variables and therefore avoid generating false positives
in these cases. The following six patterns in our catalog are associated with global
variables—specifically global variables used in conditions:
• Conditional Mem Leak
• Conditional Mem Leak External Var
• Conditional Null Ptr
• Conditional Uninit Var
• Conditional Uninit Var External Var
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• Intermediate Function Call
In Listing 4.1, we provide an example of a global variable-related false positive
pattern by way of the Conditional Mem Leak pattern. This listing shows the reduced
code (the original program was 150 lines long), which we have annotated with false
warnings from the static code analysis tools. The code snippet first allocates memory
for a char array. Next, the condition tests the value of a global variable, and the
memory is freed if the global variable evaluates to true. Because the global variable
is initialized to 1 and never changed, static code analysis tools should be able to
analyze that the memory will be freed and no memory leak will occur. Two static
code analysis tools, however, flagged a memory leak false positive for this example,
as shown by our annotations on lines 11 and 12.
1 // CWE761_Free_Pointer_Not_at_Start_of_Buffer__wchar_t_fixed_string_05 . c
2 // Pattern : cond i t i ona l−mem−l e a k
3 #include <s t d l i b . h>
4 stat ic int s t a t i cTrue = 1 ;
5
6 int main (void ) {
7 char ∗ data = (char ∗) mal loc (10∗ s izeof (char ) ) ;
8 i f ( s t a t i cTrue ) {
9 f r e e ( data ) ;
10 }
11 // Tool A FP: Memory l eak : data
12 // Tool B FP: Po t en t i a l l e a k o f memory pointed to by ' data '
13 // Tool C FP: None
14 }
Listing 4.1: Reduced code of the Conditional Mem Leak false positive pattern.
4.2.2 File Close Virtual Method False Positive Pattern
Some false positive patterns, such as Alloc Using Property and File Close Vir-
tual Method, involve user-defined classes. Listings 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show the re-
duced code for the latter pattern. Listing 4.2 defines a FileCloserBase base class
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with a virtual closeFile() method that has an empty implementation. The class
FileCloserSubclass inherits from FileCloserBase and provides an implementa-
tion for closeFile() to close a file given a file descriptor (see implementation in
Listing 4.3). The client code in the fileDemo() method of Listing 4.4 opens a file,
creates an instance of the FileCloserSubclass class, and invokes the closeFile()
method on the instance through a base pointer. Because the base closeFile()
method is declared as virtual, the invocation on line 12 of the client will resolve to
the subclass, which safely closes the file. (Executing the program through Valgrind
confirmed that no resources were leaked.) However, one static code analysis tool
flagged a false positive “Leak” warning claiming the file descriptor was never closed.
1 // CWE675_Duplicate_Operations_on_Resource__open_81 . h
2 // Pattern : f i l e −c lose−v i r t u a l−method
3 #include <unis td . h>
4 #include <s td i o . h>
5
6 namespace f i l eManager {
7 class Fi l eC lo s e rBase {
8 public :
9 virtual void c l o s e F i l e ( int f i l d e s ) {} ;
10 } ;
11
12 class F i l eC l o s e rSubc l a s s : public Fi l eC lo s e rBase {
13 public :
14 void c l o s e F i l e ( int f i l d e s ) ;
15 } ;
16 }
Listing 4.2: File Close Virtual Method false positive pattern header file.
Our documented changes to this pattern demonstrate how changes sometimes
supplemented source code reduction to isolate the core structure causing the false
positive. We observed the File Close Virtual Method pattern to be present in a
situation where there was no class inheritance. Compared to the foregoing code
example in Listings 4.2-4.4, there were two differences without inheritance: (1) the
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1 // CWE675_Duplicate_Operations_on_Resource__open_81_goodG2B . cpp
2 // Pattern : f i l e −c lose−v i r t u a l−method
3 #include " F i l eC l o s e r . h "
4 #include <unis td . h>
5
6 namespace f i l eManager {
7 void F i l eC l o s e rSubc l a s s : : c l o s e F i l e ( int f i l d e s ) {
8 c l o s e ( f i l d e s ) ;
9 }
10 }
Listing 4.3: File Close Virtual Method false positive pattern implementation file.
1 // CWE675_Duplicate_Operations_on_Resource__open_81a . cpp
2 // Pattern : f i l e −c lose−v i r t u a l−method
3 #include " F i l eC l o s e r . h "
4 #include <f c n t l . h>
5 #include <s td i o . h>
6 #include <sys / s t a t . h>
7
8 namespace f i l eManager {
9 void f i leDemo (void ) {
10 int f i l d e s = open ( " f i l e . txt " , O_RDWR|O_CREAT, S_IREAD|S_IWRITE) ;
11 F i l eC lo s e rBase ∗ f i l e C l o s e r = new F i l eC l o s e rSubc l a s s ( ) ;
12 f i l eC l o s e r −>c l o s e F i l e ( f i l d e s ) ;
13 delete f i l e C l o s e r ;
14 }
15 // Tool A FP: None
16 // Tool B FP: None
17 // Tool C FP: Leak . ' f i l d e s ' has gone out o f scope and no
18 // longer r e f e r ence s the resource o f i n t e r e s t .
19 }
20
21 int main (void ) {
22 f i l eManager : : f i leDemo ( ) ;
23 return 0 ;
24 }
Listing 4.4: File Close Virtual Method false positive pattern client file.
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FileCloserSubclass did not extend a user-defined base class, and (2) the file closer
object in the client was declared as a pointer to the subclass type (so that the base
class was not used). One change that did remove the false positive warning was
removing the user-defined namespace fileManager. Indeed, having the closeFile()
method defined in a separate namespace is a core structural feature of this pattern.
Documenting such changes made the core structure of the false positive more explicit.
4.2.3 Array Input Conditional False Positive Pattern
A static code analysis tool sometimes flags a negative warning—that is, a warn-
ing that claim a particular event does not occur. A leak warning could potentially
be a negative warning, because the warning claims a resource is never deallocated.
However, in this context, we consider only warnings where the computer’s resources
suffer no adverse consequences if the event does not occur. For example, suppose a
static code analysis tool flags a “variable is never used” warning in a program. Never
using the variable may indicate a mistake or carelessness by a programmer, but the
computer’s resources would not incur leaks or other damage just because the variable
is not used. Negative warnings are important to understand because they are easy
to show to be false; we must give only one counterexample where the event actually
does occur.
The Array Input Conditional false positive pattern in Listing 4.5 is one example
of a program that gives a negative warning. On line 16 the main() function allocates
a char array and passes it to a helper function to be initialized. The helper function
reads data from standard input and appends the data to the array. The main()
function then resumes execution to perform a search over the array for the search
character. Upon finding a match, the program prints a message.
When analyzing this program, Tool C gave an “unreachable call” warning for
the printf() statement, claiming the function is never invoked under any circum-
stances. Whether this call is actually invoked depends on the program’s input—for
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some inputs, the call will not be invoked, but for other inputs (namely, strings with
the character S within the first nine positions), the call will be invoked. Thus, the
printf() statement is necessary for program correctness. We therefore consider this
“unreachable call” warning to be a false positive. Even in domains other than the
Juliet test suite, programs may have edge cases that require special handling to en-
sure correct execution [33]. Claiming that the special sections are unreachable and the
code is erroneous is unreasonable, in our view. These special sections are needed to
correctly handle different inputs to the program and are dependent on the application
logic.
4.3 Feedback from Static Code Analysis Tool Developers
As mentioned in Section 3.6, we validated false positive patterns in our catalog
by requesting static code analysis tool developers to confirm the patterns to actually
be false positives. We initially submitted the pattern File Close Virtual Method (see
Section 4.2.2) to a developer of the commercial Tool C. The developer was initially
inclined to dismiss the false positive pattern because the Juliet test suite is synthetic
code. The developer, however, confirmed this pattern to be a false positive and
recorded it to be fixed in a future release of the static code analysis tool.
The developer then requested the remaining false positive patterns from our cat-
alog. We submitted 8 total patterns. Here are the responses we received from the
tool vendor for the false positive patterns we submitted:
• 3 patterns were confirmed to be false positives. In two cases, the developer
pointed to bugs in the tool models as producing the false positives. These
patterns are Buffer Store Socket, File Close Virtual Method, and Sscanf Uninit
Var.
• 1 pattern was characterized as a true positive. Although the warning could not
arise in the calling context as written in the Juliet test case, the warning could
37
1 // CWE761_Free_Pointer_Not_at_Start_of_Buffer__char_console_62a . cpp
2 // Pattern : array−input−cond i t i ona l
3 #include <s td i o . h>
4 #include <s t d l i b . h>
5 #include <s t r i n g . h>
6 #define SEARCH_CHAR 'S '
7 #define SIZE 10
8
9 void he lpe r (char ∗ &data ) {
10 // Read from standard in and append to array .
11 s i z e_t dataLen = s t r l e n ( data ) ;
12 f g e t s ( data+dataLen , ( int ) (SIZE−dataLen ) , s td in ) ;
13 }
14
15 int main (void ) {
16 char ∗ data = (char ∗) mal loc (SIZE∗ s izeof (char ) ) ;
17 data [ 0 ] = ' \0 ' ;
18 // Ca l l h e l p e r func t i on to i n i t i a l i z e charac ter array .
19 he lpe r ( data ) ;
20 s i z e_t i ;
21 for ( i =0; i < s t r l e n ( data ) ; i++) {
22 i f ( data [ i ] == SEARCH_CHAR) {
23 // Tool A FP: None
24 // Tool B FP: None
25 // Tool C FP: Unreachable c a l l . The f o l l ow i n g code w i l l not execute
26 // under any circumstances .
27 p r i n t f ( "We have a match ! \ n " ) ;
28 break ;
29 }
30 }
31 f r e e ( data ) ;
32 return 0 ;
33 }
Listing 4.5: Array Input Conditional false positive pattern.
be a true positive in other calling contexts. This pattern is Alloc Using External
Size.
• 1 pattern could not be reproduced, even when using the same static code analy-
sis tool version. The tool vendor believed the reason was a difference in platform,
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compiler version, or Standard Template Library (STL) version. The static code
analysis tool that flagged the warning does not make assumptions about the
STL version used; it analyzes the entire STL in the same manner as other code
in the project. Thus, the tool’s behavior is dependent on details other than the
minimized source code. This pattern is List Overrun.
• We did not receive feedback regarding 3 patterns, which are Array Input Con-
ditional, Array Resize, and Clear List.
4.4 False Positive Frequencies
Not only did we characterize false positives according to patterns, but we also
measured their frequencies. Table 4.1 gives frequencies for the false positive patterns
for the three static code analysis tools in our toolset. The false positive pattern fam-
ilies are listed in the first column. The table shows the number of times a particular
false positive pattern appeared in the Juliet test suite for a given analysis tool.
In one sense, patterns with higher frequencies carry more significance because
these patterns contribute more false positives to analysis reports that developers must
sift through. These high frequencies demonstrate significant opportunity if we can
harness the patterns to eliminate false positives. Some of the high frequencies, such
as 3,322 for the Predictable Conditional pattern, are explained in that these patterns
are composed of many variations. False positive patterns with low frequencies are
still important to document, however. As we found with the two instances of the File
Close Virtual Method pattern (see Section 4.3), a low-frequency pattern may still give
insight to static code analysis tool developers for improving their products.
Due to the sheer number of some false positive patterns, we did not verify every
warning instance. Instead, Table 4.1 reports the 95% confidence interval [34, 35] for
the lower bound of the number of false positives. For example, we are 95% confident
that Tool C flagged at least 240 instances of the Alloc Using External Size pattern in
the Juliet test suite.
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Table 4.1.: Frequencies of the false positive patterns from the Juliet test suite for our
selected toolset.
False Positive Pattern Tool A Tool B Tool C
1. Alloc using external size 0 0 240
2. Array input conditional 0 0 19
3. Array resize 0 0 12
4. Buffer store 0 0 428
5. Buffer underflow usage 3,685 0 0
6. Clear list 0 0 61
7. File close virtual method 0 0 2
8. List overrun 0 0 63
9. Null array access 0 55 0
10. Operation through alias 68 1,029 0
11. Predictable conditional 3,322 384 0
12. Return local param 1,456 0 0
13. Sscanf uninit var 0 0 2
14. Union simultaneous access 0 250 0
We obtained these frequencies through the following procedure:
1. For each false positive pattern, we isolated all warnings flagged by the static
code analysis tool over Juliet that were of the same warning type dictated by
the pattern. For example, the false warning for the Alloc Using External Size
pattern is “uninitialized variable,” so we isolated all “uninitialized variable”
warnings from Tool C over Juliet. This set was a superset of the set of instances
of the false positive pattern. That is, some warnings from this set might not
have been instances of the pattern, but the set included all instances of the
pattern.
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2. We randomly sampled and inspected warnings from the set obtained in step 1.
We determined the proportion of warnings from the sample that were instances
of the false positive pattern in question.
3. We used our sampling results to compute a 95% confidence interval for the
probability that a randomly chosen warning from the set was an instance of the
false positive pattern. In general, we used a binomial probability calculator [34]
that relied on the Clopper-Pearson (exact) method. If all of the sampled warn-
ings were instances of the false positive pattern, we instead used the rule of
three [36] from statistics to compute the confidence interval.
4. Finally, we applied the lower bound of the confidence interval to the remaining
unsampled warnings to approximate the total number of instances of the false
positive pattern [35].
It is worth noting that we applied pre-filtering to some false positive patterns in
step 1 to reduce the number of warnings requiring sampling. In the context of the
Juliet test suite, we pre-filtered the input warnings based on flow variants or CWEs.
For example, we observed the List Overrun false positive pattern to be present only
in flow variant 73 because this data flow variant uses a linked list data structure, a
core structure of the pattern. The List Overrun pattern has a “buffer overrun” false
warning. Therefore, as input to step 2 above, we isolated “buffer overrun” warnings
that were flagged in test cases with flow variant 73. In general, it is possible our pre-
filtering removed warnings that were actually instances of the false positive pattern
in question. We minimized this chance by pre-filtering only when a false positive’s
structure was described by a small set of flow variants or CWEs. For instance, because
the List Overrun false positive pattern uses a list as its core structure, and because
flow variant 73 uses a list (and no other flow variants do), pre-filtering in this case
did not degrade accuracy. Nevertheless, because we both pre-filtered warnings and
reported lower bounds on the confidence intervals, the numbers reported in Table 4.1
are conservative. That is, the actual frequencies are likely to be higher.
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Because we did not exhaustively inspect every warning from our codebase, our
false positive catalog may not be complete for the Juliet test suite for our toolset.
It is possible other false positive patterns exist that are not documented in the false
positive hierarchy. However, we have shown that false positives occur as recurring
patterns in our codebase.
In summary, we cataloged false positives from three static code analysis tools over
the Juliet test suite into 14 core false positive pattern families. Chapter 6 proposes
applying our same approach to identify false positive patterns in additional codebases,
but for now, we have focused on the Juliet test suite for the reasons given in Section 3.2
on page 10. Based on our frequency data, we found that a large number of warnings
from static code analysis tools could be characterized into a small number of patterns.
We also inferred program structures, such as global variables used in conditions, that
tended to generate false positives.
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5 FALSE POSITIVE FILTERS
In Chapter 4, we showed that false positives in static code analysis tools occur as
recurring patterns. Indeed, some patterns from our catalog occurred with frequencies
on the order of thousands throughout the Juliet test suite. In this chapter, we present
our preliminary results on harnessing these patterns to reduce the number of false
positives flagged by static code analysis tools.
5.1 Filter Approach
To eliminate false positives, we implemented checkers that encoded the structures
of the false positive patterns in order to identify the patterns in source code. We
built the checkers using Clang’s LibASTMatchers framework [37], which provides a
domain-specific language for matching nodes in the source code’s abstract syntax tree
(AST). We chose this approach because the Clang AST provides a rich query interface
with a syntax that is similar to C/C++ [38]. Appendix B gives more details of the
LibASTMatchers framework through a simple example.
We used our pattern descriptions and reduced code snippets from the catalog to
construct the checkers. For example, the description of the Conditional Mem Leak
pattern (see Listing 4.1 on page 32 for the reduced code) states that memory is
allocated dynamically outside a conditional, and the memory is freed in the if body
of a conditional that tests a global variable. Therefore, we implemented a checker to
identify a deallocation statement within the body of an if statement guarded by a
global variable. Given a source code file, the checker then identified any occurrences
of the pattern in the file along with the line number locations of the occurrences.
There was a one-to-one correspondence between patterns and checkers; that is, we
designed each checker to identify exactly one false positive pattern.
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Figure 5.1 shows our approach to using a checker to filter out false positives in
static code analysis tools. We created a script to automate the entire process in the
figure for each warning message from a tool. First, we parsed the warning message
for the filename generating the warning. Then we ran the checker over the source
code file to identify any false positives of the same pattern for which the checker was
designed. If the checker identified a false positive pattern on the warning line (i.e.,
the same line flagged by the static code analysis tool), then the tool warning was
predicted to be a false positive. Otherwise, if the checker did not identify the false
positive pattern, or if the pattern occurred elsewhere in the source code file, the tool
warning was predicted to be a true positive. Note that we use the term checker to
refer to the program that checks for the presence of a false positive pattern. A filter
is the script that applies a checker to eliminate false positives from the output of a
static code analysis tool.
Figure 5.1.: Approach for applying checkers to filter out false positive warnings.
Note that we pre-filtered the set of tool warnings as input to the checker accord-
ing to the warning class. For example, the false warning for the Conditional Mem
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Leak pattern is “memory leak.” Therefore, we did not apply the Conditional Mem
Leak checker to predict “null pointer dereference” warnings, because predicting these
warnings would require a different checker. We applied this Conditional Mem Leak
checker to predict only “memory leak” warnings.
The foregoing discussion has been in the context of applying a single checker to
predict a tool warning. It is possible for a checker to incorrectly predict a warning as
true because the warning is a false positive of a different pattern. Thus, we believe
multiple checkers should be applied to filter out as many false positives as possible.
When multiple false positive checkers are applied, the warning is predicted as a false
positive if any checker identifies the warning as a false positive. Likewise, a warning
is predicted as a true positive if no checker identifies the warning as a false positive.
Since each checker was designed to identify a separate false positive pattern, one
checker could identify a warning as true while another checker could identify the
same warning as false. Thus, when a warning is predicted to be a true positive, we
can be confident only that it is not a false positive of the patterns for which we have
applied checkers.
5.2 Preliminary Filter Results
As a preliminary experiment, we evaluated the following three false positive check-
ers for Tool A over the Juliet test suite: Conditional Null Ptr, Return Local Param,
and Conditional Mem Leak. We selected these checkers for evaluation since they in-
volved relatively simple structures. Results of the first two checkers are shown in the
confusion matrices of Figures 5.2 and 5.3.
In each case, we ran the checker over all the warnings in the Juliet test suite for
which the checker targeted. For example, we ran the Conditional Null Ptr checker
over all 3,858 “null pointer dereference” warnings from Tool A in the Juliet test suite,
since that is the false warning for this pattern. The “Predicted” columns in the figures
indicate how many warnings the filter predicted as true positives and false positives,
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Predicted 
True positive False positive 
A
ct
ua
l True positive 26 0 
False positive 283 329 
Sample size 309 329 
Population 1,570 2,288 
Figure 5.2.: Confusion matrix for Conditional Null Ptr checker for 3,858 “null pointer
dereference” warnings from Tool A.
Predicted 
True positive False positive 
A
ct
ua
l True positive 1 0 
False positive 0 307 
Sample size 1 307 
Population 1 1,526 
Figure 5.3.: Confusion matrix for Return Local Param checker for 1,527 “pointer to
local array variable returned” warnings from Tool A.
respectively. For the Conditional Null Ptr filter, 1,570 warnings were predicted to
be true, while 2,288 were predicted to be false. Because these were large population
sizes, we randomly selected a sample set from each population to give a 5% margin
of error. For example, using an online sample size calculator [39], we determined
we needed to sample 309 of the 1,570 warnings predicted as true positives to obtain
a 5% margin of error. We manually inspected the sampled warnings to determine
their actual labels and classified them according to the “True positive” and “False
positive” rows. For instance, 26 of the “null pointer dereference” warnings predicted
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as true positives were indeed true; 283 of the warnings predicted as true positives
were actually false positives; and all warnings predicted as false were indeed false.
The terms precision and recall are helpful for describing the performance of our
predictors. Precision is the portion of warnings predicted as false positives that really
were false positives, while recall is the portion of false positives predicted as false
positives [40]. We valued perfect precision, because we would rather miss filtering
out a false positive than incorrectly filter out a true positive. In the latter case,
the filter would wrongly instruct a software developer to ignore a warning message
that actually indicated a flaw, thereby introducing defective software. Likewise, we
valued high recall, although this was not a requirement. In other words, although
filtering out all false positives would be ideal (i.e., perfect recall), filtering out any
false positives would be beneficial because developer workload would be reduced.
The precision and recall results for the Conditional Null Ptr and Return Local
Param filters were promising. Both filters obtained perfect precision based on the
instances sampled (i.e., no true positives were filtered out). From these data and
a binomial probability confidence interval calculator [34], we determined, with 95%
confidence, that a warning predicted as false by a filter is indeed false with at least a
98.9% and 98.8% probability for the two filters, respectively. Therefore, a developer
would be confident that no defects would be introduced by disregarding warnings pre-
dicted as false positives by these filters. On the other hand, recall was low (0.5376) for
the Conditional Null Ptr filter because many of the false positives were not eliminated
by the filter. In fact, our data show that for a warning predicted to be true by the fil-
ter, the probability that it is indeed true falls only between 5.6% and 12.1%, with 95%
confidence [34]. Again, we are not alarmed at low recall, because low recall does not
add any additional work for the developer in sifting through warning reports. Despite
low recall, developer workload is still significantly reduced. For example, the Condi-
tional Null Ptr filter reduced the total number of “null pointer dereference” warnings
requiring developer inspection by 59.3%, while the Return Local Param filter reduced
the total number of its corresponding warnings by 99.9%.
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Figure 5.4 shows the results for the third filter, Conditional Mem Leak, to filter out
“memory leak” false positives. Notice that these results are imprecise because 12% (86
out of 702) of the warnings filtered out as false positives were actually true positives.
Because of the lower precision, we were not concerned with the population predicted
as true positives, so we randomly sampled only 50 warnings from this population.
Also, to obtain an accurate measurement, we inspected all 702 warnings that were
predicted as false positives.
Predicted 
True positive False positive 
A
ct
ua
l True positive 47 86 
False positive 3 616 
Sample size 50 702 
Population 3,685 702 
Figure 5.4.: Confusion matrix for Conditional Mem Leak filter for 4,387 “memory
leak” warnings from Tool A.
We observed that, of the 86 true positives that were incorrectly predicted as false,
some instances conformed to a pattern. Earlier in this chapter we described the Con-
ditional Mem Leak false positive pattern as memory allocated outside a conditional
that tests a global variable, and the memory is freed later in the if statement’s body.
The pattern we observed among some of these true positives was that the memory
pointer was deallocated, but the pointer no longer pointed to the beginning of the
buffer. Therefore, memory was leaked, and the tool warning was a true positive.
To avoid filtering out true positives that are of this exception case, we implemented
a specific checker to detect this case. We found this approach preferable to augmenting
the original Conditional Mem Leak checker to become a single, monolithic checker that
incorporated every exception case. We compare our approach to a general practitioner
and a specialist in the medical field. The general practitioner assesses a wide variety
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of situations, but the specialist focuses on a specific area with higher accuracy. In
the same way, the Conditional Mem Leak checker broadly predicted warnings based
on a general pattern, while the specific checker refined the predictions based on a
specific pattern. To increase precision, then, we ran the specific filter on the warnings
predicted to be false positives by the general filter. In this way, the specific checker
can be considered a “second-level checker” since it filters warnings a second time.
Figure 5.5 gives the new results after applying the specific checker. Warnings
previously predicted as true did not change their predictions, since the specific checker
did not filter these. We did not re-sample from this population, so there are no data
to report in the first column. 48 warnings previously predicted as false positives were
now correctly predicted as true positives, all of which we verified by hand. Through
the use of the specific checker, we increased precision from 87.75% to 94.19%.
Predicted 
True positive False positive 
A
ct
ua
l True positive -- 38 
False positive -- 616 
Sample size -- 654 
Population 3,733 654 
Figure 5.5.: Confusion matrix for Conditional Mem Leak filter after applying the
specific checker.
The remaining 38 warnings were incorrectly predicted as false positives because of
a different reason: there were two “memory leak” warnings on the same line for two
different variables—one warning a false positive and the other a true positive. The
checker correctly identified the false positive pattern for the first warning. However,
because our filtering mechanism did not distinguish between warnings for different
variables, the checker incorrectly predicted the second warning as false since it was
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on the same line. This error could be resolved by modifying the checkers to output
the variable name. Because this component of the thesis is preliminary work, we left
this improvement for future work.
In summary, our preliminary results for false positive filters show that we were
able to harness our cataloged patterns to reduce the number of false positives that the
developer must sift through. Our data indicated high precision, meaning that when
a checker filtered out a warning as a false positive, we were confident it could safely
be ignored. Even when a general checker filtered out true positives, we were able to
design a specific checker to refine the results, increasing precision. When applying
three filters, we were able to eliminate 59.3%, 99.9%, and 14.0%, respectively, of the
warnings as false positives, while having a minimum precision of 94.19%.
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6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, we presented an approach for identifying false positive patterns in static
code analysis. Our catalog of 14 distinct false positive patterns showed that a large
number of warnings in the Juliet test suite could be characterized into a small number
of patterns. We tested both open-source and commercial static code analysis tools
and observed some patterns to be common across tools. We showed that it is possible
to infer program structures that tend to cause false positives, such as global variables
used in conditions. We also demonstrated the practicality of using a standardized
test suite in helping static code analysis tool developers discover bugs in their tools.
Lastly, we implemented checkers to identify the structures of false positive patterns
to filter out false positive warnings from static code analysis tools. High precision of
our initial results indicated this approach to be a promising false positive elimination
technique that merits further research.
Some areas for future work are listed below:
• Expand toolset. We selected two open-source static code analysis tools and
one commercial tool for our study. This toolset was sufficient to demonstrate
the presence of false positive patterns, but additional tools would be needed to
better study the existence of false positive patterns across multiple tools or to
compare open-source and commercial tools.
• Expand codebase. We realize the Juliet test suite may not be representative
of real code, so we plan to test our approach on open-source libraries, such as
Coreutils [41] or POCO [42]. Whether the same false positive patterns (or new
patterns) emerge remains to be seen.
• Automate source code reduction. Currently, our approach involves a large
amount of manual work, which will hinder our ability to scale to larger code
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bases. A potential candidate for automation is in reducing the false positive
code snippets to their minimized forms. Iterative techniques, such as delta
debugging [43], have been used to reduce code snippets that generate compiler
warnings. However, reducing code snippets that generate static code analysis
warnings is more challenging because of the difficulty of classifying a warning
as true or false. Thus, it is possible for an automated technique to reduce
too far and convert a false positive warning into a true positive. Nevertheless,
automated reduction is still an important research area.
• Explore false positive abstraction levels. We indicated that we observed
both implementation-level and design-level false positive patterns in our catalog.
We plan to explore this distinction further to better understand the impact of
abstraction levels on encoding the pattern structures.
• Specify metamodel for describing patterns. We have specified false posi-
tive patterns in terms of both informal English descriptions and low-level, min-
imized code snippets. To eliminate false positives, our approach requires the
structures of the false positive patterns to be encoded. To simplify the process
for additional patterns, we plan to develop a language-independent metamodel
for expressing patterns. Doing so would allow us to separate the representation
of the pattern from the checker logic itself. We envision a generic checker that
would take as input both the pattern representation and a source file to inspect
for the pattern.
We have included an abbreviated catalog of our false positive patterns in Ap-
pendix A. The full catalog can be accessed at the following location: https://
github.com/SEDS/mangrove-catalog/wiki.
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A FALSE POSITIVE CATALOG
This appendix is an abbreviated catalog briefly describing each false positive pattern
cataloged in this research study. The false positive pattern names, warnings, descrip-
tions, and tools are included below. The 14 core pattern families are numbered with
Arabic numerals in the list and are sorted in alphabetical order by the pattern name.
Child patterns are indented to the right under their respective parent patterns. Pat-
tern names are set in italic font throughout this catalog. Names of abstract patterns
(i.e., patterns with child patterns) are followed by the text “Abstract Pattern.” Our
complete catalog with further details is made available on GitHub at the following
location: https://github.com/SEDS/mangrove-catalog/wiki.
1. Alloc Using External Size Abstract Pattern
Common warning: Uninitialized variable
Common description: Memory is allocated dynamically. The size of mem-
ory allocation is determined based on a variable that is initialized outside the
function that allocates memory, and the value of this size variable is somehow
passed into the function. Inside the function, memory is (1) allocated using the
size value, (2) initialized by making use of the same size value, and (3) accessed
later within the same function that initializes it.
(a) Alloc Using Function Param
Description: The value to determine the size of memory allocation is
passed from one function to another using function parameters. The mem-
ory is accessed later within the function that allocates the memory.
Tools: Tool C
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(b) Alloc Using Global Var
Description: The value to determine the size of memory allocation is
passed from one function to another using a static global variable. The
memory is accessed later within the same function. (The pattern is verified
to exist when using int, char, float, and double data types.)
Tools: Tool C
(c) Alloc Using Property
Description: The value to determine the size of memory allocation is a
private property that is initialized in the class’s constructor. (The property
is never modified outside the constructor.) The class destructor contains
the code that performs memory allocation, initialization, and access.
Tools: Tool C
2. Array Input Conditional
Warning: Unreachable call
Description: A character array is allocated and sent to a helper function to be
initialized. (In the code snippet in the catalog, the array is initialized with input
from the user through fgets().) The array is then traversed in a for loop and
an action is performed if the array contains a character of interest.
Tools: Tool C
3. Array Resize
Warning: Useless assignment
Description: A string is allocated, initialized, and passed to a helper function.
The helper function (1) saves the initial length of the string to a variable, (2)
modifies the string (using fgets() in the example in the catalog), and (3) saves
the new length to the same variable.
Tools: Tool C
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4. Buffer Store Abstract Pattern
Common warning: Tainted buffer access
Common description: Data is written into a buffer, and the amount of data
written is limited by taking into account both (1) the size of the buffer and (2)
the amount of space already used in the buffer.
(a) Buffer Store Fgets
Description: Data is read from the user through fgets() and written to
the buffer. Afterwards, the newline character appended to the buffer by
fgets() is replaced with a null character.
Tools: Tool C
(b) Buffer Store Socket
Description: Data is read from a socket and written to a buffer. After-
wards, a null character is appended to the end of the data.
Tools: Tool C
(c) Buffer Store Strncat
Description: Data is read from an environment variable and written to a
buffer using strncat().
Tools: Tool C
5. Buffer Underflow Usage
Warning: Buffer is accessed out of bounds
Description: A value is stored to a buffer after the buffer is initialized. Let
L be the length of the value that is stored. The buffer must be initialized to a
value of length less than L - 1.
Tools: Tool A
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6. Clear List
Warning: Use after free
Description: Non-zero integer values are pushed onto a list, and the values are
read using an iterator. If any value is zero, the list is cleared during iteration.
Tools: Tool C
7. File Close Virtual Method
Warning: Leak
Description: A file is opened with open() and closed by passing the file de-
scriptor to a virtual method of a class defined in a user-defined namespace. (A
more detailed description is available in the online catalog.)
Tools: Tool C
8. List Overrun
Warning: Buffer overrun
Description: A list is initialized with at least one element and passed to another
function, where it is accessed. An “access” includes the front() and back()
methods but not pop_front(), pop_back(), or begin(). (These latter methods
do not produce a FP.)
Tools: Tool C
9. Null Array Access
Warning: Value is garbage or undefined
Description: A character array is allocated, the first value is assigned the null
char, and then every character in the array (up to its length) is accessed.
Tools: Tool B
10. Operation Through Alias Abstract Pattern
Common description: An operation is performed on a resource through an
alias.
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(a) Ref Ptr Read
Warning: Stored value is never read
Description: A character array is allocated on the stack and read through
a reference to a pointer.
Tools: Tool B
(b) Subscope Leak
Warning: Memory leak
Description: A pointer is allocated memory, and it is freed through a
different pointer of the same name in a subscope. (By subscope, we mean
a scope distinct from the allocation’s scope in which the variable that has
been allocated memory is still visible.)
Tools: Tool A
11. Predictable Conditional Abstract Pattern
Common description: A conditional’s truth or falsity can always be predicted.
For example, a conditional may test a global whose value never changes.
(a) Conditional Mem Leak
Warning: Memory leak
Description: Memory is allocated dynamically before a conditional that
tests a global variable, and the memory is freed in the if body of the
conditional.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
(b) Conditional Null Ptr
Warning: Possible null pointer dereference
Description: A null variable v is set to a value inside the if body of a
conditional with a global variable that always evaluates to true, and v is
used later.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
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(c) Conditional Uninit Var
Warning: Uninitialized variable
Description: An uninitialized variable v is set to a value inside the if
body of a conditional with a global variable that always evaluates to true,
and v is used later.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
(d) Externally Defined Symbols Abstract Pattern
Common description: A conditional uses an externally defined symbol
that the analysis tool cannot reason with.
i. Conditional Mem Leak External Function
Warning: Memory leak
Description: Memory is allocated dynamically, and it is deleted in the
if body of a conditional with boolean function (defined externally) that
always evaluates to true.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
ii. Conditional Mem Leak External Var
Warning: Memory leak
Description: A pointer is allocated memory on the heap (outside the
conditional), and the memory is freed in the if body of a conditional
that tests a const global variable that is defined externally.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
iii. Conditional Null Ptr External Function
Warning: Null pointer dereference
Description: A null pointer is initialized in the if body of a conditional
with a boolean function, and the pointer is dereferenced later.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
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iv. Conditional Uninit Var External Function
Warning: Uninitialized variable / undefined pointer dereference
Description: An object is allocated in the if body of a conditional
with a boolean function, and the object is accessed later.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
v. Conditional Uninit Var External Var
Warning: Uninitialized variable / undefined pointer dereference
Description: A variable v is initialized in the if body of a conditional
that tests a const variable (that evaluates to true) defined externally,
and v is accessed later outside the if statement.
Tools: Tool A, Tool B
vi. Intermediate Function Call
Warning: Undefined pointer dereference
Description: An externally-defined function is invoked between reads
of a global variable that is evaluated in a pair of conditionals. The
externally-defined function must not modify the global variable. Con-
trol flow occurs through the conditionals such that the undefined pointer
dereference is logically impossible. (The analysis tool assumes the externally-
defined function modifies the global variable so that the undefined pointer
dereference occurs.)
Tools: Tool B
12. Return Local Param
Warning: Pointer to local array variable returned
Description: A function with a pointer parameter returns the pointer to the
caller and does not modify it.
Tools: Tool A
62
13. Sscanf Uninit Var
Warning: Uninitialized variable
Description: The sscanf() C library function is used to read a value from
a literal string, and the read will succeed given the literal string and the data
type(s) being read.
Tools: Tool C
14. Union Simultaneous Access
Warning: Memory leak
Description: Memory is allocated to one union member and freed through a
different member.
Tools: Tool B
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B CLANG CHECKER EXAMPLE
This appendix describes the LibASTMatchers framework [37] through an example.
In order to filter out false positives from static code analysis tools, we used the
LibASTMatchers framework to build checkers for identifying false positive structures.
We selected the Return Local Param false positive pattern from our catalog for
this discussion because of its simple structure.1 Listing B.1 gives the reduced code
snippet for the Return Local Param pattern. The main() function allocates a buffer
on the stack and passes a pointer to the buffer into a helper function. The helper
function merely returns the pointer directly to the caller. Tool A warns that the
helper function returns a pointer to a local array variable. However, there is no flaw,
because the pointer was defined in the caller function and therefore has meaning to
the caller.
To build a Clang checker to identify this pattern, we needed to encode the pat-
tern’s structure. The key structural component of this pattern is the return of a
pointer variable that was passed into the function. To understand how to encode
this structure, we found it helpful to view the source code’s abstract syntax tree
(AST). Figure B.1 shows the relevant portion of Clang’s AST of the program given
in Listing B.1.
Reading the Clang AST in Figure B.1 is fairly intuitive. Top-level nodes appear at
the left-hand side, while nodes further down in the tree are indented to the right. Lines
1-6 and 7-25 give the structures of the helper() and main() functions, respectively.
The two CompoundStmt nodes on lines 3 and 8 represent the two function blocks
designated with braces in the source code. The five source-code level statements in
the main() function are represented by the AST nodes beginning on lines 9, 11, 13,
1The Return Local Param pattern was described in Section 3.4, and results for applying the Return
Local Param filter to eliminate false positives were given in Figure 5.3 on page 45.
64
1 // CWE665_Improper_Initialization__char_cat_21 . c
2 // Pattern : return−l o ca l−param
3
4 char ∗ he lpe r (char ∗ data ) {
5 // Tool A FP: Pointer to l o c a l array v a r i a b l e re turned .
6 // Tool B FP: None
7 // Tool C FP: None
8 return data ;
9 }
10
11 int main (void ) {
12 char ∗ data ;
13 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 ] ;
14 data = dataBuf fe r ;
15 data = he lpe r ( data ) ;
16 return 0 ;
17 }
Listing B.1: Reduced code snippet for Return Local Param false positive pattern.
Clang AST of Return-Local-Param 
Pattern 
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Figure B.1.: Clang AST of the Return Local Param program in Listing B.1.
17, and 24. Finally, variable declarations are represented by DeclStmt nodes (as on
lines 9 and 11) with a single child node, while assignment statements are represented
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by BinaryOperator nodes (as on lines 13 and 17) with two child nodes, one for either
side of the assignment operator. For a deeper understanding, we suggest studying
Clang’s introduction to the AST [38].
Listing B.2 gives the LibASTMatchers code snippet we created to identify the
structure of the Return Local Param pattern. Note that the snippet is purely declar-
ative; we merely describe what the structure is, not how to identify it. By comparing
the code snippet in Listing B.2 with the AST in Figure B.1, the code snippet becomes
understandable. We start on line 2 by matching a return statement, so this checker
will identify the location of the return statement used in the false positive pattern.
Next, we need to extract the variable being returned, so lines 3-5 check that the
return statement node has a DeclRefExpr child node (i.e., a reference to a declared
variable). Because of the ignoringParenImpCasts component, any implicit casts or
parenthesis are ignored in this match for a child. Finally, lines 6-8 check that the
variable being returned refers to a function parameter that is of a pointer type. The
bind statements assign user-defined labels to AST nodes that can be retrieved later
in the match handler when the checker fires. This allows, for instance, our checkers
to lookup and print line numbers of pattern matches.
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1 StatementMatcher returnMatcher =
2 returnStmt (
3 has (
4 ignoringParenImpCasts (
5 declRefExpr (
6 to (
7 parmVarDecl (
8 hasType ( isAnyPointer ( ) )
9 ) . bind ( " param_var " )
10 )
11 )
12 )
13 )
14 ) . bind ( " return_stmt " ) ;
Listing B.2: Declarative snippet using Clang’s LibASTMatchers framework to
encode the Return Local Param pattern’s structure.
